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1. April 17, 2006 was the last day that a taxpayer could file state and federal tax returns for 2005.
It is used merely for illustration purposes here.  The income referred to was earned in 2006, and taxes on
that income will not be collected until 2007.
2. The Pittsburgh Steelers defeated the Seattle Seahawks in Super Bowl XL in Detroit, Michigan
on February 5, 2006.  Judy Battista, The Chase is Over, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at D1.
3. The term “jock tax” refers to taxation of nonresident athletes by foreign jurisdictions in which
they perform.  See Elizabeth C. Ekmekjian, The Jock Tax:  State and Local Income Taxation of
Professional Athletes, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 229, 230 (1994).
4. See Mike Baker, Measure Would Tax Visiting Pro Athletes; Bill Comes in Response to Other
States’ Levies, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, WA), Jan. 31, 2006, at C2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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THE “JOCK TAX”:  FAIR PLAY OR UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT
John DiMascio*
Just as the players of the Seattle Seahawks began to settle into their off-
season routines following the 2005 season, April 17  brought an unpleasant1
reminder of the loss they suffered in Super Bowl XL.  Although it may not
have set in entirely by then for many of the players, each of them likely
realized the exact nature of his loss in Detroit.  Of course the loss referred to
is not the team’s 21-10 defeat at the hands of the Pittsburgh Steelers.   Rather,2
it is the income that each player was forced to surrender to the state of
Michigan and the city of Detroit in compliance with the “jock tax”  levied by3
those jurisdictions.   It has been estimated that Michigan’s 3.4% tax on4
nonresident athletes cost the Seahawks nearly $300,000 just to play at Ford
Field.   In addition to that, the city of Detroit imposes its own 1.275% tax on5
the earnings of the athletes.   In the end, Seattle quarterback Matt Hasslebeck6
was forced to pay out an estimated $10,000 of his salary to a city and state
where he has no residence and no affiliation.7
Perhaps fed up with seeing his state’s athletes fund the budgets of other
states and cities, Washington State Representative Chris Strow recently
proposed what some have called a “retaliation tax” on nonresident athletes.8
House Bill 3104 would impose a surcharge on out-of-state professional
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9. Id.  Strow’s proposal would impose a surcharge of $3,500 on professional football and basketball
players and $750 on professional baseball players.  Id.; H.B. 3104, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006).
10. For the purposes of this note, “major professional sports team” refers to a franchise that is
affiliated with Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the National Football League,
or the National Hockey League.
11. Baker, supra note 4.
12. See Editorial, Game Over for ‘Jock Tax,’ THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, WA), Feb. 4, 2006, at
B05.
13. Id.
14. Washington, Florida, Tennessee, and Texas are the four states that host a major professional
sports team and impose no personal income tax.  Id.; Baker, supra note 4.
15. Game Over for ‘Jock Tax,’ supra note 12.
16. Marc Yassinger, An Updated Consideration of a Taxing Problem:  The Harmonization of State
and Local Tax Laws Affecting Nonresident Professional Athletes, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 751,
753 (1997).  All U.S. residents, including professional athletes, are taxed by the federal government on their
taxable income, which is defined as “gross income minus deductions allowed.”  I.R.C. § 63(a) (2005).
athletes when they play in the state of Washington.   This seems like a fair9
measure since 20 of the 24 states that host a major professional sports team10
currently impose a similar jock tax.   However, unlike those 20 states, the11
state of Washington imposes no personal income tax, and therein lies the
problem.   Mr. Strow’s bill died before the state legislature during the current12
session in Olympia.   This leaves Washington and the three other states13
hosting major professional sports teams that do not impose a personal income
tax  in a precarious position.  “[M]oney flows out of those states when their14
pro sports teams play away games, but none flows in from the income tax
states when their athletes compete [there].”15
This note will examine the problem posed above.  Part I will provide an
extensive background of the development of the so-called jock tax.  The
discussion will consider the derivation of a state’s authority to tax the income
of a nonresident that is earned within its borders and study the application of
such taxing authority to nonresident athletes.  Federal income tax
considerations will be ignored, as athletes are treated the same as all other
taxpayers for determining federal taxable income.   Part II will shift the focus16
specifically to Mr. Strow’s proposal in Washington, including an analysis of
why the proposal as it stands will not become law and whether any
alternatives exist for the four states that do not impose a personal income tax.
Part III will further analyze the desirability of the jock tax generally and
whether the tax as administered by the 20 imposing states is really much
different than the proposal in Washington.  The analysis will bring to light the
ills present in the current scheme of nonresident athlete income taxation and
will be followed by the conclusion, suggesting the abolishment of the jock tax.
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17. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
19. See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937) (“Domicile itself affords a basis
for such taxation.  Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke
the protection of its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of government.”).
20. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 53 (1920).
21. See id.
22. See Graves, 300 U.S. at 314-15.
23. The state of Illinois refuses to grant a credit to its resident athletes for taxes paid to a foreign
jurisdiction, effectively double taxing the athletes on dollars allocated to another jurisdiction.  It is the only
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE “JOCK TAX”
Two key concepts are important to understanding the practice of taxing
nonresident athletes.  First, a jurisdiction may tax nonresidents on income
earned within that jurisdiction, even though such nonresidents have no
representation in that jurisdiction.   Second, although the administrative17
burden of levying such a tax against infrequent visitors may outweigh its
benefits in a number of cases, athletes are easy targets with large salaries and
public schedules indicating where they will be on any given day.   These two18
concepts are the foundation upon which the jock tax has developed, and they
will be expounded upon in the following sections.
A.  State Taxation of Nonresidents
To understand the complexities faced by athletes in complying with state
tax law it is important to understand the provisions and circumstances that
give rise to those complexities.  It is well established that each state, as well
as each city, has the authority to tax the personal income of its residents.19
Additionally, each state may impose a tax on the income of a nonresident that
is derived from sources within the state.   This authority is based on the fact20
that the foreign state grants the nonresident the right to do business within the
state, extending to the nonresident the benefits of its government.21
Already it is apparent that a taxpayer may be exposed to double taxation
of income earned outside his state of residence.  The Supreme Court has ruled
that the Due Process Clause does not preclude such double taxation, meaning
a taxpayer’s state of residence is free to tax income earned regardless of its
source, even if that income is taxed by another state, the state in which it was
earned.   Fortunately, this theoretical exposure to double taxation of22
nonresident earnings is not a practical problem in most cases  because a23
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of the 20 states that impose a jock tax that does not grant such a credit.  DAVID K. HOFFMAN, TAX
FOUNDATION SPECIAL REPORT NO. 123, STATE AND LOCAL INCOME TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT ATHLETES
SPREADS TO OTHER PROFESSIONS 3 (2003).
24. Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 241.
25. FEDERATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS REPORT, STATE INCOME TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT
PROFESSIONAL TEAM ATHLETES:  A UNIFORM APPROACH 1 (1994) [hereinafter FTA Report].
26. See Shaffer, 252 U.S. at 49.
27. Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 238.
28. See generally Jeffrey Adams, Comment, Why Come to Training Camp Out of Shape When You
Can Work Out in the Offseason and Lower Your Taxes:  The Taxation of Professional Athletes, 10 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79 (1999) (providing extensive discussion of different allocation methods used to
determine the tax liability professional athletes face in the different tax jurisdictions in which they perform).
29. See id. at 99; Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 238.
30. The first instance of active imposition of a jock tax was by California in 1991, when the state’s
legislature voted to levy its state income tax on players of visiting teams.  Jennifer K. Davidson, Jock Tax:
Occupation Discrimination?, MD. B.J., May-June 2004, at 23, 24; HOFFMAN, supra note 23, at 2.
taxpayer’s state of residence usually grants a tax credit for taxes paid to
another jurisdiction.   The concept of tax credits as applied to athletes will be24
discussed further and illustrated in Part I.B., but at this point of the discussion,
it is sufficient to know that most often tax credits relieve any potential double
taxation burden.
Cities and states that tax nonresidents typically do so on a source basis.25
Gross income for city and state tax purposes includes only that income from
sources within the jurisdiction.   That is to say that in order for a city or state26
to have taxing authority over a nonresident, the services from which the
income to be taxed is derived must have taken place within that city or state.
It is therefore necessary to allocate the taxpayer’s income among the various
jurisdictions in which it is earned to determine the tax liability in each
jurisdiction.   The methods used by states to allocate income for taxing27
purposes can reasonably differ and have historically done so, especially with
regard to allocating the income of a professional athlete.   Regarding taxation28
of nonresident athletes, there are two generally accepted allocation methods;
the commonly used duty days method and the less popular games played
method.   These two allocation methods will be discussed in greater detail in29
the next section.
B.  Application of Nonresident Income Tax to Athletes
Although state taxation of nonresident income is not a new concept,
application of such a tax to professional athletes is a relatively recent
development.   Many states have had nonresident income tax regulations in30
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31. Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 234.
32. Id.
33. Id.; Adams, supra note 28, at 80.
34. Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 234 n.24.
35. See Robert D. Plattner, FTA Recommendations on Taxing Nonresident Athletes Could Have
Wider Application, 5 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N 36, 36 (1995) (listing factors that make taxing income of
nonresident professional athletes attractive).
36. Id.
37. Id.; Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 234.
38. See Davidson, supra note 30, at 24.
place for decades but applied the regulations primarily to entertainers such as
musicians.   Athletes were not targeted for many years because tax officials31
felt that the amount of income allocated to their state would be insignificant,
perhaps not even worth the administrative burden of collecting.   That32
attitude changed dramatically though as the salaries of professional athletes
began to escalate significantly during the 1980s.   New York State33
Department of Taxation and Finance Director of Taxpayer Services Gabe
DiCerbo summed up the change in attitude toward taxing nonresident athletes
by saying, “What triggered our interest in athletes is their salaries are getting
bigger and bigger.  We suddenly found there was now enough dollars to make
it worth our while.”34
In addition to the growth in salaries, several other factors made taxing the
income of nonresident professional athletes very attractive.   Professional35
athletes are well-known individuals, it is easy to determine when they are
present in a particular taxing jurisdiction given their schedules, as
nonresidents they cannot express their displeasure through voting, and the
athletes cannot avoid the taxing jurisdiction since their schedules determine
the sites at which they will play.   Coupling these considerations with the fact36
that during the early 1990s many state and local governments were faced with
fiscal pressures from external economic conditions such as a recession, cuts
in federal funding, and the growth of budget deficits, it is no surprise that
when forced to seek untapped sources of revenue officials turned to the
increased enforcement of nonresident tax laws against athletes.37
1.  How the Practice Began
California became the first state to actively impose a jock tax when the
state’s legislature voted to actively levy its state income tax on players of
visiting teams in 1991.   The decision came just after the Chicago Bulls38
defeated the Los Angeles Lakers four games to one in the NBA Finals, playing
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39. Id.; HOFFMAN, supra note 23, at 2.
40. Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 235.
41. Hugh Dellios, Legislators OK ‘Jordan’s Revenge,’ CHI. TRIB., July 1, 1991, at 3.  Senator
Fullerton remarked, “I heard Michael was being taxed when the Bulls were playing the Los Angeles Lakers
in the NBA Finals, [and] I thought that was unfair . . . . Why should we be losing money to the state of
California?”  Id.
42. Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 235.
43. See Baker, supra note 4.
44. HOFFMAN, supra note 23, at 2.
45. See Baker, supra note 4.
46. Id.
47. Richard E. Green, The Taxing Profession of Major League Baseball:  A Comparative Analysis
of Nonresident Taxation, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 273, 290 (1998).
48. See id.
49. See Leslie A. Ringle, State and Local Taxation of Nonresident Professional Athletes, 2 SPORTS
and winning the last three games of the series in California.   In considering39
the measure, state tax officials estimated that in that year alone California
would collect two to three million dollars from out-of-state athletes.   Illinois40
responded to California’s act the following year by passing a bill proposed by
state Senator John Fullerton that was informally entitled “Michael Jordan’s
Revenge.”   The bill is a reciprocal taxing measure that applies only to41
athletes from states that impose a nonresident income tax on Illinois athletes.42
Just as Illinois felt compelled to reciprocate, so too did many other states,
and once the idea of collecting taxes from nonresident athletes was out of the
bag, it spread quickly.  At present, every state hosting a major professional
sports team that levies a tax on personal income actively levies that tax on
nonresident athletes that visit the state.   The jock tax sometimes exists as a43
separate tax law, but is usually “just an aggressive extension of an income tax
to selected nonresidents.”   Washington, Texas, Tennessee, and Florida are44
currently the only four states with major professional sports teams that do not
tax the personal income of their residents and thus do not impose a jock tax
on nonresident athletes.   Despite that fact, it is clear now that even those45
states may try to get into the game.46
In addition to the 20 states, several cities that are home to major
professional sports teams impose their own tax on the earnings of nonresident
athletes who come to play in those cities.   Examples include Cleveland,47
Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City, and the first city to tax nonresident athletes
at the local level, and arguably the most aggressive, Philadelphia.48
Philadelphia tax officials announced their intention to collect from
nonresident athletes earning income within the city in 1992, before many
states had even taken such a step.   The move was prompted by a deficit that49
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LAW. J. 169, 169 (1995).
50. Michael deCourcey Hinds, Philadelphia Mines New Tax Sources, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992,
at A14.
51. Id.
52. Hank Grezlak, Philadelphia Lawyers May Face Taxes From Other Areas; But Double Taxation
is Not a Result, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 29, 1993, at 3.
53. See Adams, supra note 28, at 99-100.
54. Id.; Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 238.
55. See Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 240; Yassinger, supra note 16, at 758; Adams, supra note 28,
at 100.
56. See Green, supra note 47, at 282; Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 240.
57. See Stemkowski v. Comm’r, 690 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1982).
58. The duty days approach takes into consideration more than just game days, including other
was estimated at the time to grow to about $1 billion by 1996.   The solution50
seemed ideal to the newly elected mayor Edward Rendell, as it allowed him
to squeeze more revenue from existing tax laws but to extract that revenue
from taxpayers outside of his constituency.   Philadelphia did not stop with51
athletes either.  The city has actively targeted nonresident entertainers,
doctors, and attorneys who perform services and earn income within the city.52
2.  Allocation of Income
Once a jurisdiction has decided to tax the income of nonresidents earned
within its borders, that jurisdiction must determine a method by which it will
compute the amount of the nonresident’s total income that is to be allocated
to it.  States are free to formulate their own allocation methods, and
historically states have attempted different approaches.   Generally, two53
allocation methods have been used:  the duty days method and the games
played method.54
a.  Duty Days Approach
The duty days method has historically been the more widely accepted
approach to allocating income.   California was the leading advocate of this55
method, which a majority of states decided to adopt.   The duty days method56
has also received the approval of the federal government, as it is the system
by which income is apportioned between the United States and Canada for
federal income tax purposes.   Compared to the alternative games played57
method, the duty days approach is viewed as a more complete and realistic
way to apportion income, encompassing more of the services that athletes
perform in earning their income.   The approach determines the portion of an58
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activities that athletes have a contractual obligation to undertake.  See Adams, supra note 28, at 100-02.
59. See FTA Report, supra note 25, at 12.
60. See Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 238-39; Ringle, supra note 49, at 174.
61. Adams, supra note 28, at 100.
62. FTA Report, supra note 25, at 4.
63. Id.
64. Because the number of days that an athlete will spend performing in each foreign jurisdiction
is set by his schedule, increasing the denominator of the ratio will decrease the amount of his total income
that is allocated to each foreign jurisdiction.  If it is predetermined that a New York athlete earning
$1 million will spend 5 duty days in California, then each day that can be added to his total number of duty
days decreases the fraction by which he will multiply his $1 million salary to determine the amount of
income taxable by California.
athlete’s income allocable to the particular taxing jurisdiction by multiplying
the athlete’s total income by a ratio of the number of duty days spent within
the jurisdiction to the total number of duty days, or all days in which the
athlete performs services in satisfaction of a contractual obligation.59
The total number of duty days (the denominator in the ratio) is generally
defined to include all practice days, game days, and travel days from the
beginning of the team’s official preseason training through the last game in
which the team competes, including any postseason play.   In addition, taxing60
authorities normally include off-season days in which the athlete has a
contractual obligation to perform services, such as camps, instructional
leagues, all-star games, team imposed training activities, and promotional
events.   The number of duty days spent within a particular jurisdiction (the61
numerator of the ratio) includes not just game days within that jurisdiction,
but also days spent there on which a required practice or meeting was held, as
well as travel days that include a game, practice, meeting, or other required
service.   Travel days that involve no game, practice, or other required service62
are not apportioned to any particular state, but are included in the total number
of duty days.63
A quick analysis of the duty days approach illustrates why it is the more
accepted approach.  It favors the state that applies it, ensuring that a resident
athlete will pay as little as possible to foreign jurisdictions and as much as
possible to the state in which his home team is located.  This is true whether
or not that state is the athlete’s state of residence.  Because the formula
considers not just game days, but all days that include performance of some
contractual obligation (practice, training, meetings, etc.), the denominator of
the ratio is maximized, thus decreasing the percentage of the athlete’s total
income that will be allocated to each separate foreign jurisdiction.64
Furthermore, because the bulk of such additional activities will occur in state
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65. Stemkowski v. Comm’r, 690 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1982); Favell v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 700,
702 (1989).
66. Stemkowski, 690 F.2d at 45; Favell, 16 Cl. Ct. at 722.
67. In neither case was off-season conditioning found to be a mandatory part of the athlete’s
contract.  Neither ruling precludes inclusion of off-season conditioning where it is found to be an explicit
requirement of a contract.  See Adams, supra note 28, at 105-07.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 104.
where the athlete’s team is located, increasing the numerator of the ratio for
that state, most of the athlete’s total income will be allocated to that state.
In addition to favoring the home state, the duty days approach can result
in significant tax benefits for players that are able to perform contractual
obligations in the location of their choice.  Two cases have argued that an
athlete should be allowed to include individual off-season training in the
number of total duty days, the denominator of the ratio.   Although both cases65
were unsuccessful on their particular facts,  both rulings could be interpreted66
to suggest that under certain circumstances off-season training may be
includable.   The argument turns on whether such training is a contractual67
obligation or a condition of employment.68
If allowed to include such days, an athlete could decrease his tax burden
by conducting off-season training in a state that does not impose a nonresident
tax on athletes.   This would increase his total number of duty days, the69
denominator in the ratio, lowering the amount of income allocable, and in turn
the tax dollars owed, to each state and city.  The days added to the
denominator would have to be allocated to the state in which the training was
conducted, but if that state imposes no tax, then there is no corresponding
payout due.  The catch is that the income would still be taxable by the
athlete’s state of residence, as any resident’s income would be taxed.
However, for athletes that reside in a state that imposes no personal income
tax, this trick may significantly lower their total tax bill.  This illustrates the
benefit to Major League Baseball franchises of holding spring training in
Florida.  In addition to the great weather, the players are able to increase the
number of total number of duty days with days that are allocable to a state that
imposes no income tax.  This means that the athlete’s state of residence, often
the home state of the franchise for which he plays, will reap the benefit of
taxing the income allocable to those activities, as they do not have to grant a
credit since Florida does not tax that income.
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70. See Adams, supra note 28, at 103.
71. Id. at 102-03.
72. Id. at 103.
73. Id.
74. See Ekmekjian, supra note 3, at 240.
75. See Yassinger, supra note 16, at 756.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 756-57.
78. See id. at 757; Plattner, supra note 35, at 36.
79. FTA Report, supra note 25, at 2-3.
80. See Plattner, supra note 35, at 36-37; Adams, supra note 28, at 103.
b.  Games Played Approach
The alternate and less popular allocation method used to apportion
income between taxing jurisdictions is the games played method.   This70
method uses a formula much like the one used in the duty days approach, but
the ratio involved reflects the number of games played in a particular
jurisdiction to the total number of games played.   With this method,71
determination of the numbers to be used in the ratio is simpler because it takes
into consideration only game days.   Inherent in its simplicity is its72
shortcoming.  It “fails to reflect that athletes are paid for services in addition
to game performances such as practice days, team meetings, and public
relations activities.”   However, the games played method was previously the73
method of choice in New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.74
c.  A Move to Uniformity
As more states began to tax nonresident athletes, inconsistent application
of the tax and variation in the allocation methods used among the states led to
fear of double taxation of some portions of the athlete’s income.   Even the75
states that used the same method of allocation may define the revenue that
would be generated differently.   The frustration and discontent with the76
inconsistency led then Kansas City Chiefs owner Lamar Hunt to approach the
Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA) with a plea for the development of
a consistent and more uniform approach.   In response, the FTA created a77
Task Force to help solve the problem.   The report issued by the FTA Task78
Force called for a uniform apportionment formula and suggested the duty days
method as the preferred allocation method.79
The FTA Task Force’s report led to the abandonment of the games played
method by the states, with the favored duty days formula prevailing.   New80
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81. Adams, supra note 28, at 103-04.
82. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
84. Id.
85. Graves, 300 U.S. at 314-15.
86. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
York, the last state to use the method, gave up on it as of January 1, 1995,
switching to the more accepted duty days approach and thus ending its
significance.81
3.  Application of Tax Credits
With a framework now in place of how states allocate and tax the income
of nonresident athletes, the issue of tax credits should be revisited.  Suppose
an athlete resides in New Jersey, plays for a New York sports franchise, and
over the course of the season plays away games in ten of the twenty states that
impose a jock tax.  The athlete’s total income is taxable by his state of
residence, New Jersey.   Most of that income is earned in and allocable to82
New York, where he plays his home games, attends practice, and attends team
meetings and functions.  That income derived from services performed within
New York is taxable by that state as well.   Additionally, the income derived83
from services performed within each of the ten other states, where the athlete
plays in away games, is taxable by the state in which it is earned.   This84
means that each dollar earned by the athlete would hypothetically be taxed
twice, once by his state of residence and once by the state to which the income
is allocated, or where it was earned.  Even if the athlete lived in New York,
where he plays his home games, every dollar allocable to road trips would be
subject to such double taxation.
The first reaction of any taxpayer might be, “That is not fair.”  Fair or not
though, the Supreme Court has ruled that such a practice is not prohibited by
the Constitution.   Fortunately, almost every state grants its resident taxpayers85
a tax credit for amounts paid to other jurisdictions to prevent double
taxation.   For residents of states that levy a personal income tax the end86
result is essentially the same, although residents of low rate states will end up
paying a little more than they would otherwise because of payments owed to
high rate foreign states.  But in any case, so long as credits are granted by the
state of residence, each dollar is being taxed only once.  If the state of
residence is one that imposes no income tax, then credits are meaningless and
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87. Yassinger, supra note 16, at 764.
88. HOFFMAN, supra note 23, at 6.
89. Id.
do not exist.  That taxpayer simply incurs tax liability that he would not
otherwise incur.
With the exception of residents of states that impose no personal income
tax, a taxpayer’s liability does not typically change too dramatically due to the
grant of a tax credit by the state of residence.  Thus the real loser is the state
granting the credit.  That state is losing tax revenue from the income of its
residents to another state.  How is the lost revenue replaced?  The state
imposes its own tax on nonresident athletes.   So at a glance it seems like the87
whole process evens itself out.  The athletes are taxed on each dollar only
once because of the tax credit granted by their home state, and the home state
that loses tax dollars to those states imposing nonresident taxes makes up the
lost dollars by taxing the athletes visiting from the other states.
There is a catch though with the receipt of tax credits for taxes paid to a
nonresident state.  The resident state, the state granting the credit, generally
credits only up to the amount the home state would have collected.   Each88
dollar above what the athlete would have paid to his home state, due to a
higher rate of taxation in the foreign jurisdiction, is a dollar that is not
credited, subjecting the athlete to a higher tax burden than the home state
would.  If the home state taxes at a higher rate than the foreign jurisdiction,
home states will typically take advantage of the disparity by taxing the athletes
for the difference.89
States that grant tax credits to resident taxpayers are effectively conceding
the loss of potential revenue.  Dollars that would otherwise fund the state’s
government as revenue from state income tax are instead funding the
government of a foreign jurisdiction.  This concession forces each state to
reciprocate by taking a more active approach to collecting from nonresidents
earning income within its own borders.
II.  ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON BILL AND
ALTERNATIVES FOR “NO INCOME TAX” STATES
The concession of lost tax revenue and replacement through an active,
reciprocal taxation of nonresidents by a state that imposes a personal income
tax is not a surprising cause and effect.  But what about those states that
choose to fund their government through other means?  Seven of the fifty
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90. Alaska, Florida, Nevada, Texas, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming impose no individual
income tax.  Additionally, New Hampshire and Tennessee levy a tax on individual income only in the form
of dividends or interest, but not on wages and salaries.  CURTIS S. DUBAY & SCOTT A. HODGE, TAX
FOUNDATION BACKGROUND PAPER NO. 51, STATE BUSINESS TAX CLIMATE INDEX 16-17 (2006).
91. See HOFFMAN, supra note 23, at 7 (“States that have franchises but no income tax—Florida,
Tennessee, Texas and Washington—are indifferent.  They do not gain revenue when athletes visit, and they
don’t lose revenue when their athletes are taxed by other states because, of course, they grant no credits.”).
92. H.B. 3104, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006).
93. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
states do not tax the personal income of their residents.   One might argue90
that because such states are granting no credit to excuse tax dollars paid to
foreign jurisdictions, those states are losing nothing when a foreign
jurisdiction taxes their residents.  There is no loss of tax revenue because the
states have chosen not to tax a resident’s individual income.   This argument91
is not entirely true though.  When a resident of a state that imposes no
personal income tax is taxed by a foreign jurisdiction, potential revenue that
would otherwise fund the government of the state of residence is being
forfeited to the foreign jurisdiction.  Although the state of residence is not
losing outright income tax revenue, disposable income is flowing out of the
state in the form of payment to a foreign jurisdiction.  Every dollar of
disposable income that flows out is one less that can be spent within the state
of residence, meaning less sales tax revenue, less property tax revenue, and
generation of less revenue of whatever form that state uses as an alternative
to personal income tax.
This brings us to the problem faced by Mr. Strow in Washington.
Although Washington does not impose a personal income tax on its residents,
Strow hoped to find a way to bring to his state the benefits that other states
receive when nonresident athletes visit to perform contractual duties, and
more importantly a way to protect against the outflow of disposable income
caused by taxation of Washington residents by foreign jurisdictions.
Mr. Strow’s proposal was in the form of a flat surcharge, administered on a
per game basis, on nonresident athletes when they visit the state of
Washington to perform in a sporting event.92
It is not hard to see the logic behind Mr. Strow’s proposal.  Other states
protect themselves from revenue lost to foreign jurisdictions in the form of
jock tax payments by imposing their own jock tax on nonresident athletes that
perform within their state.   Washington should protect itself from lost93
revenue in a similar matter.  The protective measure will not be administered
exactly the same as in the other states since Washington does not levy a
personal income tax, but the principle seems to be the same.
966 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:953
94. See DUBAY & HODGE, supra note 90, at 23.
95. Id.  Washington is the only state with a gross receipts tax on top of a high statewide sales tax.
Id.
96. See id. at 23.  Washington ranks third among the states with the highest gasoline tax and third
among states with the highest tobacco tax, per pack of cigarettes.  See id. at 26.
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It seems like Mr. Strow has a point.  The fact that the state of Washington
chooses not to tax personal income does not mean that the state’s government
funds itself.  The citizens of Washington are still responsible for funding, but
through means other than taxation based on their individual levels of personal
income.  The most significant means used by Washington for funding its
budget is the state sales tax.   In addition to a state sales tax of 6.5%,94
Washington levies a gross receipts tax and a local option sales tax.   The state95
also levies a relatively high property tax and high excise taxes to generate
funding.   Although Washington does not lose revenue in the form of forgone96
income tax payments when the state’s athletes are taxed by foreign
jurisdictions, the flow of disposable income out of the state leaves less money
in the hands of Washington residents, meaning less money spent within the
state.  Consequentially, that means generation of less government funding of
through sales and excise taxes, the state’s primary means of raising revenue.
Mr. Strow’s proposal is a clear and logical reciprocal measure to replace
lost sales and excise tax revenue resulting from taxation of Washington
residents by foreign jurisdictions.  In theory it would accomplish the same end
that states imposing a personal income tax accomplish through enforcement
of reciprocal jock tax provisions.  It would replace government funding that
is lost when another state taxes the income of Washington resident athletes.
However, in its method, the proposal is flawed.  Mr. Strow’s proposal comes
in the form of a tax against nonresidents who enter the state to perform
services.   For that reason the proposal comes into conflict with the interstate97
commerce clause.98
The interstate commerce clause gives the federal government the
authority to regulate commerce among the several states.   The negative99
implication of the clause, known as the dormant commerce clause, stands for
the principle that states may not pass laws that impact interstate commerce,
causing harm to other states.   This prohibits a state from imposing a tax on100
goods or services coming into that state from another state in a manner that
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104. District of Columbia v. Eastern Trans-Waste of Maryland, Inc., 758 A.2d 1, 17 (D.C. 2000)
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105. Additionally the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section
2, prohibits one state from taxing citizens of another at a higher rate.  Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,
252 U.S. 60, 78, 82 (1920).  In the case of a percentage tax on nonresident athletes, this clause would come
favors in-state business over out-of-state business for no other reason than
location.   This is the flaw of Mr. Strow’s proposal in Washington.101
The charge that would be imposed upon nonresident athletes by House
Bill 3104 takes the form of a tax rather than a fee.   The tax would be102
imposed exclusively on nonresidents, and revenues generated by the tax would
directly fund state football, baseball and basketball facilities.   Thus, the tax103
entails differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests,
benefiting the former while burdening the latter, and such a tax is in violation
of the commerce clause.104
Ultimately, the problem faced by the bill’s proponents in Washington is
that without a state personal income tax, the state has nothing behind which
to mask the reciprocal measure.  One might argue that any state taxation of a
nonresident athlete’s income fails the dormant commerce clause, but states
that impose a personal income tax can easily pass such a jock tax off as a
uniform part of their income tax scheme.  Those nonresidents taxed have been
granted the right to conduct business within the state, earning income there
and benefiting from the state’s governmental services while doing so.  The tax
does not unfairly burden nonresidents any more than it burdens residents.
Everyone is taxed uniformly, so the interstate commerce clause is not
impinged upon.
The question that remains in Washington and the other states that do not
impose a personal income tax is whether there is any alternate way to make
up for revenue lost when foreign jurisdictions chip away at the disposable
income of state residents.  The preceding dormant commerce clause analysis
shows that any surcharge levied only against nonresident athletes will be
struck down.  This holds true under the analysis whether the measure is a flat
surcharge like the proposal in Washington, or a percentage tax on the income
of the nonresident athlete allocable to the state.   The states are likely to stop105
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106. This is an instance of a uniform tax on a service, applied to those originating both in state and
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those imported from another state.  Take apples for example.  Simplistically, and for illustration only, one
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of singling out a particular profession to tax, other problems are raised).
107. Those resident athletes would be charged for every game played in the state just as nonresidents
would.  This would add up very quickly as they play the majority of their games at home.
108. Take for example the case of Matt Hasselbeck, raised in the introduction.  He was forced to pay
out an estimated $10,000 to Michigan for performing in the Super Bowl.  See supra note 7.  It is unlikely
that any athlete visiting another state merely for the purpose of playing a game will spend enough within
that state to incur a sum of $10,000 in sales taxes.
far short of considering imposition of broad state income tax in response to
such a narrow problem.  The remaining alternative lies in between the two
previous solutions.  States could impose a surcharge on all athletes, both
resident and nonresident.  This would cure the interstate commerce clause
problem.   However, such proposal is unlikely, and it is even more106
improbable that it would pass.  Such a measure would be too damaging to in
state sport franchises, and those organizations would fiercely oppose it.107
With seemingly little recourse in the way of an income tax, the states are
left with the alternative methods that they impose upon their own residents for
revenue collection.  Any sort of property tax can be immediately ruled out.
Nonresident athletes that visit only to play have no property in the state to tax.
It is true that while in the state, the nonresident athlete is subject to the same
sales and excise taxes as all other residents, and that such sales and excise
taxes, as the primary methods of revenue generation used by a state not
imposing an income tax, may likely be higher than the sales and excise taxes
the visiting athlete pays in his home state.  The home state of the nonresident
athlete visiting the no-income tax state may not even charge a sales tax.  This
could be analogized to a nonresident athlete from a state with no income tax
paying income taxes to a foreign state on the income earned there.  However,
this is realistically a poor analogy.  First, the amount of income tax liability
incurred by an athlete for one road trip would grossly exceed the amount of
sales tax paid to a state for purchases within by an athlete on a road trip.108
Second, an athlete who visits a state that levies a high sales tax can choose not
to spend his money in that state during that trip, effectively removing himself
from subjection to the tax.  The athlete visiting a state that imposes a
nonresident income tax does not have that choice.  That athlete is required by
his schedule to travel to the venue, and he may not opt to refrain from paying
the tax.
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113. For example, an athlete may have incentives and bonuses written into his contract that are
contingent upon things such as staying healthy and being available for a certain number of games, including
those on the road.
III.  EVALUATION OF TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT ATHLETES GENERALLY
Examination of the problem faced in Washington and the lack of
solutions should lead to a reexamination of the practice of taxing nonresident
athletes altogether, exposing the faults of the jock tax.  It hardly seems fair to
allow 20 of the states with a major professional sports team to fight with each
other over who can pull the most from the wallets of professional athletes
from other states to fund the government of their own, but to force the four
remaining states hosting a team to watch the pockets of their athletes be
picked with no recourse, based simply upon the method by which those states
have chosen to fund their governments.  At least three factors support an
argument in favor of abolishing the practice of taxing nonresident athletes.
Those three, discussed below, are the lack of economic nexus between the
income earned and the nonresident state, the selective enforcement of the
nonresident income tax, and the burden that professional athletes face in
complying with the provisions.  Considering all three, the jock tax simply
appears to be poor tax policy.
A.  Economic Nexus
While the taxation of nonresidents on a source basis has been approved
by the Supreme Court,  it has been questioned whether the income of a109
nonresident athlete that is taxed by a foreign jurisdiction is actually derived
from sources within the foreign jurisdiction.   An athlete is a salaried110
employee of the organization for which he plays, and his paychecks are issued
in the state of the home team.   “[T]hose paychecks are in no substantial way111
dependent on the specifics of the team’s travel schedule.”112
An athlete is taxed by a foreign jurisdiction that his team visits because
that jurisdiction deems part of his income to be derived from sources within
that jurisdiction.  While it is fair to say that an athlete’s salary as a whole may
be attributable to, or perhaps to some extent contingent upon,  the games he113
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plays in several states, one could argue that it is inaccurate to say that the
income is derived from sources within the several states.  For example,
consider one athlete’s road trip to a foreign jurisdiction for one game.  If the
jurisdiction imposes a jock tax, it will be levied against the athlete on an
amount equal to his whole salary multiplied by the ratio representing the
number of duty days spent in the foreign jurisdiction to the total number of
duty days for which his salary is paid.  But in reality the athlete’s salary will
remain the same if the player for some reason does not travel with the team,
if the player does travel but never takes the field due to an injury or any other
reason, or even if not one person purchases a ticket and attends the game.114
If this is the case, how can any income be deemed derived from sources within
the state?
The last scenario in the preceding list best illustrates the tenuousness of
the connection between an athlete’s income and the out-of-state locations in
which he plays.  Professional sports teams generate their revenue primarily
from sources like home game ticket sales, broadcasting rights, and
merchandising contracts.   Although there is some revenue sharing among115
franchises in some leagues, the majority of these economic activities are
within the team’s home state.   Because these revenues pay the salaries of116
the team’s athletes, the athletes’ income is earned through economic
transactions in his team’s home state, not in the other states in which he
performs.   To reiterate the former point, an athlete could play every away117
game in front of an empty stadium, and his paycheck would be unaffected.
To define “source of income” in the way that a typical jock tax provision
currently does is a dangerous and unwise step.  Such a definition implies that
the income of every pilot, every truck driver, and every railworker must be
apportioned among the several states through which he passes in the course
of his job.  It may often be the case that no part of his salary is actually
derived from within those states, but his job requires his presence in each.
The burden of enforcing a nonresident income tax on all such people would
certainly outweigh the benefits derived.
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B.  Selective Enforcement
The reasons athletes are targeted by foreign jurisdictions are obvious and
have already been touched upon.   To allow states to target a specific118
profession in such a way though seems irrational.  If a state attempted to tax
all athletes, resident and nonresident, but no one else, such an attempt would
likely be thwarted.  However, the way that most states administer their
nonresident income tax provisions singles out the professional athlete,119
leaving in reality a tax on out-of-state athletes entering the state to perform
services.  Given the tenuous nexus between the imposing state and the income
earned, we now have what looks quite similar to the proposed bill in
Washington.  The differences are that one uses flat fee and the other a
percentage of an arbitrarily determined amount, and that one state raises
revenue primarily through sales and property taxes while the other uses
primarily a tax on the income of its residents.
A nondiscriminatory administration of any purported source based
nonresident income tax would be enforced beyond the professional athlete,
rather than selectively applied to him.  No jurisdiction makes their intent with
regard to application of the tax more clear than Cincinnati.  There, visiting
professionals not employed by professional athletic teams only have to pay the
city’s nonresident income tax if they work in the city for 12 or more days per
year.   Not athletes though.  They pay from day one.120 121
The practical burden of strict enforcement upon pilots, truck drivers, and
the like, mainly tracking time spent within a jurisdiction, is recognized, but
states could at least make a good faith effort to remind such people to file a
return in an attempt to enforce nonresident income tax provisions fairly.  The
burden of tracking those in the medical, legal, and business worlds would
seemingly be a bit lighter, as their trips to a foreign jurisdiction would mostly
likely be less frequent and of longer, more significant duration, rather than
merely passing through.
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C.  The Compliance Burden
There likely are not many willing ears to sit in on a conversation of how
the poor professional athlete faces the unfair burden of filing returns in several
different states.  People tend to have little sympathy for multi-million dollar
earners.  But the fact is that most states are reaching into the pockets of any
team affiliate that travels with the team.   This includes the mediocre athlete,122
struggling to keep a roster spot, who knows he probably does not have too
many years in the league to earn.  It also includes coaches, scouts, and
trainers, some of which may have quite moderate salaries.   The expense of123
tax preparation for such people may be a burden heavily felt.
IV.  CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that House Bill 3104 in Washington, or any similar proposal
for that matter, will ever become law, and perhaps rightfully so.  However, the
proposal should open the door to criticism of the jock tax provisions that are
imposed in the 20 collecting states.  The tax is poor policy.  Among the states
that tax the personal income of residents, it simply shifts tax revenues from
one state to another, due to the grant of tax credits by most states, with the
states that tax at high percentages winning at the expense of those that tax at
lower percentages.  Even worse, in the case of states that fund their budgets
through non-income based taxes, no recourse is available to compensate for
the potential revenue that is lost when disposable income of their own
residents flows out to fund the budgets of foreign jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the nonresident taxpayers are stuck with what can amount
to very large compliance expenses.  While this may not be a problem for those
at the top of the pay scale, it is certainly felt by lower paid athletes, coaches,
and other team affiliates such as trainers, broadcasters, and scouts.  Worst of
all, such people are targeted merely because of the nature of their profession.
Because the salaries of athletes in the upper echelon are so large and because
one look at a team’s schedule will tell you when each athlete was within any
given jurisdiction, the attention of the jurisdiction’s tax administrators is
focused on athletes and team affiliates, while other professionals like doctors,
lawyers, and business executives, who often bring in comparable lifetime
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earnings, are ignored.  In summation, the whole concept seems like poor
sportsmanship.
